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Abstract
An investigation of exchange market pressure against the pound sterling dur-
ing the inter-war period. The main findings are that a) the behavior of UK fun-
damentals relative to those of the USA help to explain exchange market pressure
against the pound; b) during the run up to devaluation in September 1931 the
monetary authorities in the UK were acting to reduce domestic credit; but that
c) additional pressure was brought against the pound from speculative sources.
These findings relate to current thinking on the choice of exchange rate regime as
even well behaved fundamentals may not be sufficient to sustain a currency on its
peg.
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This paper offers an investigation of exchange market pressure against the pound sterling 
during the inter-war period, 1925-1931, when the pound was pegged to the US dollar 
through their links to gold. We believe that this investigation is relevant today for what it 
tells us about the viability of exchange rate pegging. In the “unholy trinity” of pegged 
exchange rate, open capital markets and independent monetary policy, the latter must be 
largely given up if the former two are to be viable. What we find is that, even though the 
Bank of England seemingly responsibly managed the money base within the confines of 
the latitude offered by the exchange rate band between the gold points, the pound was 
still subjected to speculative capital outflows – especially in the four months before it was 
knocked off of its peg on September 21st, 1931. If this interpretation of our findings is 
correct, the viability of open capital markets along with pegging is questionable even 
when the authorities behave responsibly.  
 
At issue is whether the Bank of England played by the ‘rules of the game’, by which is 
usually meant that changes in the money base were strictly determined by the balance of 
payments? Eichengreen, Watson and Grossman (1985) from their econometric evidence 
argue that it did not play strictly by that rule as interest rates were sometimes managed to 
influence business conditions in the UK which for most of the period under consideration 
were depressed. The Bank of England would cut interest rates in order to stimulate the 
economy only to have to raise them again to protect the balance of payments and the 
pound’s peg to gold. In fact, some latitude was afforded to the Bank of England by the 
pound’s fluctuation band between the gold points.  Lower interest rates could be 
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sustained so long as the exchange rate moved only within the band and did not threaten to 
breach it.  
 
Figure 1 shows that the pound-dollar exchange rate did indeed fluctuate between 
estimates of the gold points.1 What we find in our econometric estimate of the exchange 
market pressure model is that when the Bank of England increased the rate of domestic 
credit expansion, exchange market pressure on the pound-dollar exchange rate would also 
increase. That is, the exchange rate depreciated within the fluctuation band and foreign 
exchange reserves fell. However, we think that the Bank of England’s monetary policy 
during 1925-1931 was in fact well behaved because the peg to gold and dollar was 
maintained for more than six years in very difficult world economic circumstances and 
with an open capital account. Indeed, the experience of the pound during this period was 
far superior to that of the members of the European Monetary System during the 1980s 
when currency realignments were very frequent even though exchange rate fluctuation 
bands were relatively wide and capital accounts were not necessarily fully open. 
 
Another strand of evidence that supports the view the Bank of England was conservative 
in its management of the money base comes from our calculation of pound-dollar 
realignment expectations in the foreign exchange market. We show that between the 
pound’s return to the gold standard in 1925 and June 1931 the market did not expect the 
pound to be devalued. Our empirical evidence here is based on the target zone model due 
                                                          
1 The estimated gold points shown in Figure 1 are those of Officer (1993). The gold points were determined 
by the cost of moving gold across the Atlantic Ocean, and as interest costs were incurred in doing so, the 
gold points were not constant but fluctuated with interest rates. According to Officer’s calculations the gold 
points averaged about 0.6% either side of parity. 
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to Krugman (1988 and 1991) as extended by Svensson (1991, 1993) and Bertola and 
Svensson (1993) and is described in section 2 below. However, in the summer of 1931 
devaluation expectations turned strongly against the pound, in the sense that they became 
statistically significant and larger than at any other time during the previous six years.  
 
But why did this run on the pound occur when it did? We find that over the period as a 
whole, exchange rate expectations did affect current pound-dollar exchange rate 
movements within the band, and that in the last three months of the regime the markets 
were expecting a devaluation of the central parity. However, on the evidence that we are 
able to present we are not convinced that this speculative attack against the pound was by 
any means entirely provoked by the Bank of England’s management of the money base. 
Indeed, the money base had increased by only four percent in the first six months of the 
year – hardly a runaway rate of expansion and, as is shown below, during the seven 
months before the September 1931 devaluation of the pound the Bank of England's 
management of domestic credit was helping to reduce exchange market pressure on the 
pound.  Rather we side with the view of Cairncross and Eichengreen (1983) that the 
speculative attack against the pound was provoked by something else. Cairncross and 
Eichengreen estimate the determinants of the level of the UK’s gold and foreign 
exchange reserves using macroeconomic and monetary data from 1926 to early-1931 and 
forecast reserves for the rest of 1931. They find that since actual reserves were much less 
than forecasted something else must also have contributed to the weakness of the pound. 
This “something else” could well have been the financial crises in Austria and Germany 
that cut the Bank of England off from some of its assets and gave warning that other 
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countries too could be vulnerable.2 Another telling point that the speculative attack 
against the pound was a surprise is that prior to summer 1931 there was no mention of a 
possible exchange rate crisis in important publications such as The Economist and the 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. Nor did the forward pound move outside of the gold points 
during 1931 prior to the actual crisis, except briefly in January (Eichengreen, 1992).  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 1 a model is developed to explain exchange 
market pressure against the pound. Section 2 discusses how the Krugman (1988, 1991) 
target zone model, as extended by Svensson (1991 and 1993) and Bertola and Svensson 
(1993), can be used to reveal realignment expectations during the UK’s gold standard 
pegging episode of 1925-1931. These realignment expectations are used in section 3 as 
an independent variable and are shown to contribute to exchange market pressure against 
the pound along with the macroeconomic and monetary variables derived from the 
exchange market pressure model. Conclusions are drawn in section 4. 
 
Section 1: Exchange market pressure and the pound 
The exchange market pressure model is a natural development out of the monetary 
approach to the balance of payments and the monetary approach to the exchange rate. 
The two fundamental assumptions of these models are that agents have desired levels of 
real money balances, and that while the balance of payments is made up of three sub-
accounts – goods, capital and money – which sum to zero, the analytical emphasis is on 
                                                          
2 That the pound-dollar gold peg was indeed vulnerable was well understood at the time. The MacMillan 
Committee, in pointing out that the UK was financing current and long-term capital account deficits with 
short-term (reversible) capital inflows, concluded that the UK’s balance of payments position was 
“precarious”. 
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the monetary account. The two central equations of these models are pairs of money 
demand and money supply functions, one for each country in a two-country world. 
Money demand is a standard function of real income, prices and nominal interest rates, 
and the domestic money supply is backed by domestic assets and gold and foreign 
exchange acquired over time through central bank foreign exchange intervention. 
 
What Girton and Roper (1977) do in their seminal paper on exchange market pressure 
(and extended by Weymark, 1995, 1998) is, in effect, to combine the monetary 
approaches to the balance of payments and to the exchange rate into a single model. 
Thus, if an exchange rate is allowed to move within a fluctuation band (or, target zone), 
taken separately, neither movement of the exchange rate nor the movement of foreign 
exchange reserves will necessarily give an accurate measure of exchange market 
pressure. For example, the exchange rate could be steady or even appreciating, while 
foreign exchange reserves where falling rapidly. However, taken together, movements in 
rates and reserves can be used to indicate exchange market pressure. 
 
The Girton and Roper model of foreign exchange market flow equilibrium can be 
expressed in logarithms as 
 
 ***                    tt
s
ttt
s
t fdmfdm ∆+∆=∆∆+∆=∆    (1) 
 ****      ttt
d
tttt
d
t iypmiypm ∆−∆+∆=∆∆−∆+∆=∆ αβαβ   (2) 
 tttt spp θ+∆+∆=∆ *        (3) 
 ttt ii δ+∆=∆ *         (4) 
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Variables with an asterisk signify US variables and those without an asterisk, domestic 
UK variables. Equation (1) sets the growth in the supply of base money (∆mst) equal to 
the sum of domestic credit expansion (∆dt) and the growth of foreign exchange reserves 
(∆ft). Equation (2) describes the growth of demand for nominal domestic money balances 
(∆mdt) in terms of growth in domestic prices (∆pt), real income (∆yt) and an appropriate 
index of nominal interest rates (∆it). Equivalent money supply and demand relationships 
hold for the USA. The income elasticity of demand for money is β, and the interest semi-
elasticity of demand for money is α. Equation (3) allows relative purchasing power parity 
to hold continuously if the real exchange rate, θt, is forced equal to zero. However, 
variations of the real exchange rate from zero means that purchasing power parity does 
not hold exactly. Note that the nominal exchange rate (the price of the dollar in terms of 
pounds) is defined such that a positive value of ∆st represents the rate of depreciation of 
the pound. Equation (4) simply sets δt equal to the change in the interest rate differential.3  
Svensson (1993, page 766) points out that the interest differential may combine both 
exchange rate expectations and a risk premium – an increase in the differential indicating 
some combination of (a) increased expectations of depreciation and (b) a greater 
premium attached to that risk. In common with most papers in this area we will continue 
to regard the interest differential as indicating just expectations of future exchange rate 
changes because which ever component increases, pressure on a currency will increase as 
investors readjust their portfolios against it.  
 
                                                          
3 Weymark (1998) discusses the role of exchange rate expectations in the derivation of model-consistent 
exchange market pressure indices. Thus, static exchange rate expectations would mean δt represents 
changes in the risk premium implicit in domestic interest rates. 
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An issue is how to measure exchange market pressure (EMP) against a currency. 
Weymark (1998) develops a model-independent formula to calculate exchange market 
pressure that she claims can be applied to virtually any exchange rate model, such as the 
monetary-asset approach used in this paper. She defines EMP as the total excess demand 
for a currency and shows that it can be measured by the exchange rate change which 
would have been required to remove the excess demand in the absence of money or 
foreign exchange market intervention, given that expectations are generated by the 
exchange policy actually implemented.  However, since this definition of EMP is 
unobservable (because the authorities usually do intervene in the markets, particularly in 
the period under examination here), it needs to be made operational, and that requires a 
model.  Weymark (1998) argues that model-specific measures of EMP should conform to 
her model-independent definition. In general, this independent measure is stated as the 
expected change in the exchange rate plus the weighted change in foreign exchange 
reserves.4 The magnitude of the weight may have to be econometrically estimated from a 
structural model of a macro-economy.5  
 
Some manipulation of equations (1)-(4) yields: 
 
 ( ) ttttttttt yyddsff αδθβ −−∆−∆+∆+∆−=∆−∆−∆ ***   (5) 
 
The composite dependent variable in equation (5) is the Girton-Roper model-specific 
measure of exchange market pressure (where the weight on reserve changes is unity). A 
                                                          
4 This assumes that changes in domestic credit are not an instrument of exchange rate policy. 
5 Spolander (1999) includes a very detailed discussion of this process. 
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lower numerical value of this EMP measure signifies greater pressure against the Bank of 
England because there is some combination of a decline in the rate of growth of UK 
foreign exchange reserves relative to reserve growth in the USA and a rise in the rate of 
the pound’s depreciation (a rise in ∆st). According to the model, EMP against the pound 
increases with an increase in the UK’s rate of domestic credit expansion, or its rate of 
interest (i.e. δt increases), or with an increase in the real exchange rate. Pressure 
diminishes with an increase in the rate of growth of British real income relative to that of 
the USA. Weymark (1998) shows that the Girton and Roper (1977) model-specific 
formula for exchange market pressure that we deploy does conform to her model-
independent formula. Tanner (2001) is in agreement with this. 
 
2: Revealing realignment expectations 
If an exchange rate is to be confined to a target zone, financial markets need to believe 
that the authorities are willing to defend that zone otherwise international capital flows 
will destroy the peg. Thus, monetary policy must be used to defend the parity. The 
exchange rate is determined as: 
 
[ ] dtdsEvms tttstt α++=              (6) 
 
As earlier, in natural logarithms, st is the domestic currency price of foreign exchange,  
mst is the money supply, and α is the semi-elasticity of demand for money.  The term v is 
a general purpose term that includes anything else that impacts the demand or supply for 
money (e.g. changes in real income).  Most simply v is taken to be the cumulative value 
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of velocity (Miller and Weller, 1991).  Shocks to velocity are assumed to be random with 
zero mean, and to be normally distributed such that the cumulative value of v follows a 
continuous-time random walk.  The term, Et[dst]/dt, is the instantaneous rationally 
expected rate of change of the exchange rate.  
 
To maintain credibility, an exogenous shock to fundamentals such as a fall in real 
economic activity that would otherwise push the exchange rate outside of the target zone 
must be offset by a monetary contraction – for instance, by open market sales of domestic 
securities or a rise in discount rate.  At the edges of the target zone monetary policy must 
be geared exclusively to the exchange rate and not, say, towards influencing business 
conditions.  But when the exchange rate is in the interior of the zone the monetary 
authorities do have some freedom of action.  The domestic interest rate can differ from 
the foreign interest rate provided that the indicated exchange rate expectation is not 
forced outside of the intervention points.  
 
A measure of realignment expectations has been developed in Svensson (1991, 1993), 
and Bertola and Svensson (1993).  Thus, in natural logarithms at time t the nominal 
exchange rate, st, is: 
 
ttt cxs +=              (7) 
 
where ct is the central parity and xt is the proportionate deviation from parity.  Taking 
time derivatives: 
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[ ] [ ] [ ] dtdcEdtdxEdtdsE tttttt +=      (8) 
 
Equation (8) says that the rationally expected rate of change of the exchange rate can be 
divided into the expected movement ‘within the band’, Et[dxt]/dt, plus the expected rate 
of depreciation of the central parity, Et[dct]/dt.  Furthermore, for any given xt, the 
movement within the band is bounded by the lower (“strong”) gold import point and 
upper (“weak”) gold export point. 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) dtxxdtdxEdtxx tuttttlt −≤≤−      (9) 
 
where xl is the lower bound of st, and xu, the upper bound. 
 
On using equations (8) and (9) we discover the confidence interval for realignment 
expectations: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) dtxxiidtdcEdtxxii tlttttttuttt −−−≤≤−−− **   (10)    
 
where as before it is the home country’s interest rate and i*t is a comparable interest rate 
in the foreign country.  The term (it - i*t) has been substituted for Et[dst]/dt because we are 
assuming that uncovered interest parity holds. Thus, equation (10) defines the minimum 
and maximum bounds of the market’s rationally expected rate of realignment of the 
central parity (a 100% confidence interval, assuming the gold points are known with 
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certainty).  
 
Rearranging equation (8) obtains a statement of the rationally expected realignment 
expectation as: 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] dtdxEdtdsEdtdcE tttttt −=     (11) 
 
This realignment expectation can be calculated if the two terms on the right hand side are 
known.  The total expected change in the exchange rate, Et[dst]/dt, is known from the 
interest differential.  Svensson (1993) details a simple but robust method for calculating 
the expected movement of the exchange rate within the band.  He takes this to be a linear 
function of the current deviation of the exchange rate from the central parity, xt, such that 
the expected movement of the exchange rate within the band is empirically estimated as 
the fitted value from the following regression: 
 
tttmt uxaaxx ++=−+ 10       (12) 
 
In this unit root test, mean reversion is occurring if a1 is significantly less than zero. 
 
Implementing equation (12) using pound-dollar exchange rate data for May 1925 (the 
month when the UK began pegging after world war I) to August 1931 (the full month 
before pegging was abandoned), we find evidence, reported in Table 1, of mean reversion 
within the band of the pound-dollar exchange rate.  The regression is conducted with m 
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set equal to three months to match the maturity of the forward rate contracts used later in 
this paper.  This choice of m induces second order serial correlation in the equation so all 
statistics are computed using Newey-West generalised method of moments estimators 
(see Sarno and Taylor, 2002, appendix C). 
 
It is perhaps not surprising to find mean reversion in an exchange rate that in fact 
remained within its band for as long as six years.  However, it can be noted that mean 
reversion is not inevitable.  A currency could move to an intervention point and then just 
bump along there without reverting to the center of its band.  Rather, the finding of mean 
reversion indicates that the market indeed had confidence in the pound. Cairncross and 
Eichengreen (1983) document that confidence in the pound recovered once the 
speculative episodes of 1927 and 1929 were weathered. Also, the finding of mean 
reversion suggests that the relative price level issue that had so bedeviled the UK’s return 
to the gold standard after WWI – the UK’s price level having risen sharply relative to that 
of the USA after the abandonment of the gold standard in 1914 – was not a direct factor 
affecting the exchange rate.  Certainly, a lower relative UK price level might have eased 
the Bank of England’s job of keeping the pound on gold by giving it greater freedom to 
reduce interest rates, thereby allowing some stimulus to the depressed British economy. 
However, the fact of the matter is that, notwithstanding the depressed British economy, 
the Bank of England was prepared to manage interest rates to keep the pound on gold. 
 
The final step in implementing equation (11) is to take the 95% confidence intervals for 
mean reversion calculated using equation (12), and to combine them with the interest rate 
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differential data, which proxy for Et[dst]/dt, to calculate ‘95%’ confidence intervals for 
realignment expectations. 
 
We reproduce our calculations of monthly realignment expectations for the pound-dollar 
exchange rate May 1925 to August 1931 in Figure 2.  When the upper and lower bounds 
for realignment expectations are on different sides of the zero line (or x-axis) realignment 
expectations are not statistically significant.  That is, there is no strong evidence of 
speculation against the pound.  However, things were very different in the summer of 
1931 when realignment expectations turned strongly against the pound (the upper and 
lower bounds of realignment expectations were both positive).  This provoked capital 
outflows from the UK, exerting exchange market pressure against it, so much so that the 
pound was to be bumped off of its gold-dollar peg. 
 
3: Empirical results revealing exchange market pressure 
But what was the cause of exchange market pressure against the pound? To investigate 
this question we implement equation (5) which, it will be recalled, shows exchange 
market pressure as being determined by macroeconomic variables and a monetary 
variable, the rate of domestic credit expansion, that was under the direct control of the 
Bank of England. 
 
Equation (5) is tested using monthly data for the interwar gold standard period. Since 
reliable contemporaneous quotations of interest rates of the same maturity are hard to 
find for this period we assume covered interest parity holds and use the forward 
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premium/discount as our measure of the interest differential.  Our data sources are: spot 
and three month forward exchange rates from Einzig (1937, appendix 1). Reserves data 
from various issues of League of Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.  Data on the 
money base of USA from Friedman and Schwartz (1970), and that of the UK from Capie 
and Webber (1985).  National income data is proxied by industrial production with US 
data taken from Federal Reserve Board (1943) and that for the UK from League of 
Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.  Finally, price series data were abstracted from 
Federal Reserve Board (1943).  We seasonally adjust all data except the spot and forward 
exchange rate series using the RATS “esmooth” command.  Table 2 contains some brief 
descriptive statistics of the key series.  It is noticeable that monthly annualized growth of 
domestic credit, growth of industrial production and inflation were all negative on 
average during this period for both the UK and USA.  
 
The equations presented in table 3 were estimated using the McCallum-Wickens 
instrumental variables technique. In each case the dependent variable is exchange market 
pressure and the exchange rate is the pound-dollar rate.  The instrument set is the 
dependent and each explanatory variable lagged by two and three periods, together with a 
constant and a time trend.  The figures in parentheses under the coefficient estimates are 
t-statistics computed with Newey-West GMM standard errors, robust to serial correlation 
and heteroskedasticity.   
 
Column A of table 3 details the results of the most rigid interpretation of equation (5).  
The coefficient on UK domestic credit growth is statistically significant, correctly signed 
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and not far from its theoretical value of minus unity (a test of this restriction cannot be 
rejected – see H1).  US domestic credit growth and relative income growth rates are both 
insignificant (though correctly signed).  The coefficient on the real exchange rate term 
carries the correct sign and is significantly different from both zero and its theoretical 
value of minus unity (H2).  Finally, the coefficient on the change in our proxy for the 
interest differential, δ, is also significant and correctly signed.  Column B of table 3 
loosens the restriction that the income elasticity of demand for money is equal in the two 
countries.6  There are two points to note.  First, the coefficient on US (UK) income 
growth is significantly positive (insignificantly negative).  Second, the coefficient on the 
real exchange rate is now insignificantly different from its hypothesized value. 
 
In columns C and D we decompose changes in the interest rate differential proxy into 
changes in the expected movement of the exchange rate within the band, ∆E[dxt]/dt, and 
changes in the expected rate of devaluation of the pound, ∆E[dct]/dt, based on equation 
(8). Both of these factors are expected to affect exchange market pressure on the Bank of 
England, though perhaps not equally.  With equal and opposite signs imposed on income 
growth in the two countries (column C), the two new terms are both negative and 
statistically significant while the other coefficient estimates are essentially unchanged 
from the baseline regression in column A.   
 
Removing the restriction on income growth we obtain the results in column D.  The 
adjusted coefficient of determination is highest in this version of the model while the 
                                                          
6 We would have also liked to relax the assumption that the interest semi-elasticities are equal in the two 
countries, however since we do not have reliable interest rate data and are instead using the forward 
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standard error of the equation is the lowest, suggesting this to be the statistically preferred 
specification.  Coefficient estimates are little changed from the regression in column B. 
Thus, an increase in the UK’s rate of domestic credit expansion, ∆dt, increases exchange 
market pressure, as do changes in the macroeconomic variables – the UK’s real exchange 
rate, θt, and faster economic growth in the US. The joint hypothesis that the coefficients 
on UK domestic credit growth and the real exchange rate term are both equal to –1 
cannot be rejected. The rate of US domestic credit expansion has the correct sign but is 
insignificant in every specification of the regression. Perhaps this is due to the well 
known fact that during the period the USA was not playing by the rules of the game since 
it was sterilizing the effect of its payments surpluses on its money base.   
 
What is most interesting about this last regression is the correct and significant signs on 
∆E[dxt]/dt  and ∆E[dct]/dt.  Significantly, an increase in realignment expectations, 
∆E[dct]/dt, increased pressure against the pound.  This pressure, according to the 
definition of EMP, taking the form of depreciation of the pound within the band, or a 
reduction in foreign exchange reserves to protect the pound, or both.  What is happening 
is that a rise in E[dct]/dt – an increase in either the probability or the magnitude of the 
expected devaluation of the pound – is encouraging capital outflows which in turn are 
pressuring the Bank of England to intervene.  Importantly, this speculative pressure is 
additional to the pressure exerted by the fundamental variables in the regression equation; 
the rates of domestic credit expansion and real income growth in the UK and the USA, 
and the real exchange rate. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
premium to measure the spread, this is not possible. 
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Figure 3 plots the contributions to exchange market pressure from the significant terms in 
the final specification of our estimation (column D).  The solid line shows the dependent 
variable, EMP.  The pressure on the pound in May-August 1931 was such that EMP took 
four of its five lowest values.  The only other time the pound had been under such 
downward pressure was in the speculative attack of late 1929.  Focusing on the period 
after January 1930 several points are noticeable.  First, domestic credit growth in the UK 
and US were always acting to reduce exchange market pressure on the pound (the 
relevant bars are always positive in the final twenty months of the peg).  Conversely, the 
real exchange rate is always adding to the pressure.  The remaining two terms – changes 
in the expected reversion within the band and changes in the expected devaluation – 
regularly switch sign.  Most significantly, however, in the critical final two months of the 
peg devaluation expectations were adding hugely to the pressure on the pound.  Indeed, if 
we exclude the effect of changes in devaluation expectations, pressure would have turned 
positive in July 1931 and been only slightly negative in August 1931.  This situation can 
be compared to earlier episodes of pressure on the pound.  At the local minima of EMP in 
March 1927 and October 1929, changes in devaluation expectations were acting to 
reduce exchange market pressure on the pound.  In July-August 1931, changes in 
devaluation expectations did not come to the rescue and, in combination with an 
overvalued real exchange rate, in fact drove the pound off gold. 
 
4: Conclusions 
Our main finding is that exchange market pressure against the pound while it was 
operating a peg to gold and through it to the US dollar during the inter-war period is quite 
 18
well explained by the models that we use here.  Furthermore, we find that devaluation 
expectations had statistically and economically significant explanatory power in addition 
to the behavior of UK fundamentals.  The main implication of this latter finding is that 
disciplined management of fundamentals even over a period as long as six years may not 
be enough to maintain a currency peg.  As capital outflows from the UK during the 
summer of 1931 where not necessarily driven by fundamentals, perhaps the peg could 
have been saved by the imposition of capital controls.  Put differently, we find that the 
“unholy” trinity of a pegged exchange rate, open capital markets and an independent 
monetary policy may not be viable even when monetary policy appears to be disciplined.  
We think that this unfortunate experience is relevant to the choice of an exchange rate 
regime today. 
 
 
Table 1: Expected change of the exchange rate within the band 1925(6) - 1931(8) 
 
Constant 0.854 
(1.860) 
x -0.622 
(3.53) 
  
R2 0.310 
Standard error 0.00197 
 
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are t statistics computed with GMM standard errors to account for serial 
correlation induced by the overlapping observations. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Series Mean Min Max 
Change in UK reserves  0.03% -0.39% 0.47% 
Change in US Reserves  1.88% -15.14% 17.29% 
Change in UK domestic credit  -1.03% -4.10% 7.27% 
Change in US domestic credit  -1.59% -38.03% 62.07% 
Change in UK industrial prod.  -5.03% -236.82% 260.19% 
Change in US industrial prod. -2.39% -26.18% 21.14% 
UK inflation  -2.27% -6.78% 0.91% 
US inflation  -5.83% -21.87% 5.99% 
Notes:  All values monthly averages given in annualized percentage form. 
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Table 3: Exchange market pressure on the pound-dollar exchange rate: 1925 - 1931 
 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Constant -0.001 
(1.177) 
-0.0001 
(0.132) 
-0.001 
(1.256) 
-0.0002 
(0.327) 
∆d -1.240 
(2.195) 
-1.366 
(2.408) 
-1.398 
(2.431) 
-1.460 
(2.822) 
∆d* 0.083 
(0.716) 
0.069 
(0.538) 
0.095 
(0.798) 
0.101 
(1.001) 
∆y-∆y* 0.001 
(0.032) 
 -0.003 
(0.798) 
 
∆y  0.009 
(0.351) 
 0.002 
(0.117) 
∆y*  -0.306 
(1.996) 
 -0.272 
(1.980) 
θ -0.416 
(2.883) 
-0.824 
(3.404) 
-0.501 
(3.466) 
-0.849 
(4.157) 
δ -9.086 
(3.524) 
-9.477 
(3.692) 
  
∆E[dx]/dt   -2.300 
(4.542) 
-2.087 
(5.375) 
∆E[dc]/dt   -1.690 
(2.472) 
-1.797 
(2.445) 
     
Adj-R2 0.053 0.002 0.192 0.304 
Standard error 0.0055 0.0057 0.0051 0.0047 
Q-statistic 22.61 17.18 29.40 23.64 
P-value 0.26 0.58 0.06 0.21 
     
H1 0.67 0.52 0.49 0.37 
H2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
H3 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.46 
H4 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.19 
 
Notes:  ∆d denotes the growth of domestic credit (domestic credit defined as base money less reserves), and 
∆y denotes the growth in income as proxied by industrial production. An asterisk denotes a foreign (US) 
variable. θ is the UK’s real exchange rate, and δ denotes the growth in the interest rate differential as 
proxied by the forward premium. ∆E[dxt]/dt  and ∆E[dct]/dt denote respectively changes in the expected 
movement of the exchange rate within the band and changes in devaluation expectations.  The figures in 
parentheses beneath the parameter estimates are t-statistics derived using GMM standard errors robust to 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.  Some descriptive and diagnostic statistics are reported beneath 
the parameter estimates.  Adj-R2 gives the adjusted coefficient of determination.  The next row gives the 
standard error of the estimated equation.  Q-statistic denotes the Q-test for serial correlation of up to 19 
lags, and the P-value statistic gives the significance level of the Q-statistic.  The figures H1-H4 denote the 
significance of chi-squared tests of coefficient restrictions.  H1 imposes the constraint that the coefficient 
on the growth of domestic credit is –1.  H2 imposes the restrictions that the coefficients on UK and US 
domestic credit growth are equal to –1 and +1 respectively.  H3 restricts the coefficient on θ to be –1, and 
H4 restricts the coefficient on the growth of domestic credit to be –1, and the coefficient on θ to be –1. 
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 Figure 1 Pound-dollar spot exchange rate and estimated gold points
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Figure 2: Estimated realignment expectations
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Figure 3: Contributions to exchange market pressure 
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